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In this Article, I explore the practical and theoretical conflicts that might
surface when the diversion movement and the Victims’ Rights Movement
intersect. I focus on two possible sites of tension: victim input into the di-
version offer and the victim’s right to receive restitution as a term of diver-
sion. Protocols to give victims greater voice in the justice process have been
a mainstay of the burgeoning Victims’ Rights Movement for the past sev-
eral decades, but I argue that those protocols must be understood within
(and thus limited by) the contexts of fiscal responsibility, compassion for
the offender, and proportionality in the justice system that lie at the heart of
diversion schemes. Any other arrangement risks elevating retribution over
rehabilitation and inserts a level of arbitrariness into the diversion process
that would subvert our commitment to fairness and transparency.
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I. INTRODUCTION
MORE than two decades ago, prosecutors, judges, and legislatorsrealized that the business-as-usual approach to criminal justicewas far too costly in terms of human lives and dollars spent for
the thousands of people each year who commit relatively minor offenses.
Inspired by this realization, they created diversion programs aimed at
shuttling low-level offenders out of the criminal legal system at early in-
tercept points, and guided by eligibility standards and program require-
ments set by prosecutors’ offices.1 The development of diversion
programs thus represented the convergence of several ideals that previ-
ously had been subordinated to law-and-order policymaking: a concern
for fiscal responsibility, a greater sense of compassion for low-level of-
fenders, and a commitment to proportionality in criminal justice.2
But by the time diversion programs were emerging in the late 1990s, a
strong countercurrent was already underway. The Victims’ Rights Move-
ment, which began in earnest in the mid-1970s, insisted that crime victims
would no longer tolerate being ignored. The movement led to the enact-
ment of statutory “victims’ bills of rights” and constitutional amendments
in many states in the United States in the 1980s and 1990s.3 A federal
constitutional amendment was also proposed, but it never gained much
traction due to the inherent conflict with many provisions of the Sixth
Amendment and the level of activity already happening in the states to
protect victims’ interests.4 Recently the victims’ rights initiative has taken
on new urgency, with a wave of state constitutional amendments known
as “Marsy’s Laws” seeing passage via voter referendums in various
jurisdictions.5
While both the diversion movement and the Victims’ Rights Movement
seek to reform the criminal legal system and to dislodge what reformers
1. Ronald F. Wright & Kay L. Levine, Models of Prosecutor-Led Diversion Programs
in the United States and Beyond, 4 ANN. REV. CRIMINOLOGY 331, 334, 338 (2021).
2. 21 Principles for the 21st Century Prosecutor, BRENNAN CTR. FOR JUST. 5, 24, 25
(Dec. 3, 2018), https://www.brennancenter.org/sites/default/files/2019-08/Report_21st_cen-
tury_prosecutor.pdf [https://perma.cc/Z7GX-4C3V]; Winifred Agnew-Pauley, Diversion in
the Criminal Justice System: Examining Interventions for Drug-Involved Offenders, in RE-
THINKING DRUG COURTS: INTERNATIONAL EXPERIENCES OF A US POLICY EXPORT 123,
124 (John Collins, Winifred Agnew-Pauley & Alexander Soderholm eds., 2019) (“The
motivations for implementing diversion programmes are varied and wide-ranging, includ-
ing, for example, introducing a greater emphasis on public health outcomes; addressing the
stigma associated with, and the criminogenic influence of, formal contact with the CJS;
lessening the burden on criminal justice resources, such as overcrowded prisons; and im-
proving the cost-effectiveness of the CJS.” (citation omitted)).
3. Aileen Adams & David Osborne, Victims’ Rights and Services: A Historical Per-
spective and Goals for the Twenty-First Century, 33 MCGEORGE L. REV. 673, 675–76
(2002).
4. Robert P. Mosteller, The Unnecessary Victims’ Rights Amendment, 1999 UTAH L.
REV. 443, 465–66.
5. See generally Paul G. Cassell & Margaret Garvin, Protecting Crime Victims in State
Constitutions: The Example of the New Marsy’s Law for Florida, 110 J. CRIM L. & CRIMI-
NOLOGY 99 (2020).
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see as outdated principles and practices, these two movements offer or-
thogonal (and sometimes conflicting) visions for reform. It is no doubt
true that many victims support rehabilitation over punishment, both as an
abstract ideal and in their own lives.6 But the Victims’ Rights Movement
seems not to capture those voices, as it seem to embody a preference for
retributivism over rehabilitation, for cages over services, and for vindic-
tiveness over shared humanity. For that reason, the claims of the Victims’
Rights Movement suggest the legal system should ignore or undermine
fiscal responsibility, proportionality, and compassion for the offender—
the very hallmarks of diversion. In short, the potential irreconcilability of
diversion principles and victims’ rights claims puts legislators and prose-
cutors in a bind as to which road to follow. The fact that victims are a
politically popular constituency7 (and criminal defendants are not) makes
the issue ripe for outside input, given that legislators and chief prosecu-
tors in most jurisdictions seek reelection on a regular basis.
In order to limit the likelihood that resolution of these questions will
be driven by political expediency rather than integrity,8 scholars ought to
weigh in on whether victims should be included in the creation and imple-
mentation of diversion schemes. The answer is not a binary yes-or-no
choice because even if we conclude that victims deserve a seat at the ta-
ble, we might have to impose limits on victim input in order to prevent
the erosion of diversion’s foundational principles. As Kristin Henning ob-
served in the context of the juvenile justice system, “As long as rehabilita-
tion remains an important and viable objective . . . [,] legislators must
carefully consider how victims’ rights will advance or undermine this
objective.”9
While the impact of the Victims’ Rights Movement on the criminal le-
gal system has been a mainstay of scholarship for several decades,10 this
Article brings that conversation to the diversion programming context.
6. ALL. FOR SAFETY & JUST., CRIME SURVIVORS SPEAK: THE FIRST-EVER NATIONAL
SURVEY OF VICTIMS’ VIEWS ON SAFETY AND JUSTICE 15 (2016) (finding that victims sup-
port rehabilitation over punishment by a two-to-one margin). That this paper does not deal
with the conflicts that might arise when a victim wants the offender to receive diversion but
the program eligibility rules do not permit it, based on the offender’s crime or criminal
history.
7. Mosteller, supra note 4, at 474–75; see also Janice Nadler & Mary R. Rose, Victim
Impact Testimony and the Psychology of Punishment, 88 CORNELL L. REV. 419, 453 (2003)
(observing that prosecutors have shifted towards using more victim impact evidence);
James A. Blanco, Reparation and Restitution: Louisiana’s Response to the Victims’ Rights
Movement, 33 LOY. L. REV. 393, 398 (1987) (declaring that advocacy in support of victims’
rights legislation in the 1970s and 1980s became “politically popular, bipartisan, and na-
tional in scope”).
8. Even if prosecutor elections have historically tended not to be contentious, see
Ronald F. Wright, How Prosecutor Elections Fail Us, 6 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 581, 592–94
(2009), prosecutors still tend to make decisions with an eye toward reelection impact.
9. Kristin Henning, What’s Wrong with Victims’ Rights in Juvenile Court?: Retributive
Versus Rehabilitative Systems of Justice, 97 CALIF. L. REV. 1107, 1122 (2009).
10. See, e.g., Charles F. Baird & Elizabeth E. McGinn, Re-Victimizing the Victim: How
Prosecutorial and Judicial Discretion Are Being Exercised to Silence Victims Who Oppose
Capital Punishment, 15 STAN. L. & POL’Y REV. 447, 448–55 (2004); Susan Bandes, Empa-
thy, Narrative, and Victim Impact Statements, 63 U. CHI. L. REV. 361, 366–80 (1996). For a
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After providing the reader a quick tour through the diversion landscape
in Part II and the Victims’ Rights Movement in Part III, I examine two
points of intersection in Part IV. I first take up the question of victim
input into the diversion offer. I contend that providing victims notice and
an opportunity to confer on case resolution is an important feature of the
victims’ rights agenda, and it should be extended to the diversion context.
But providing victims a veto goes beyond seeking their input—it would
inappropriately allow the victim to block the offer of diversion to a defen-
dant who is otherwise considered eligible and suitable for the program. I
next address the inclusion of restitution in the diversion program scheme.
Restitution is regularly mentioned as a right of the victim in statutory and
constitutional provisions, but it tends to be in reference to adjudication
outcomes. Because diversion is quite plainly not adjudication, how resti-
tution applies is a question that prosecutors’ offices must decide without
legislative direction. After considering the benefits and burdens of requir-
ing that the defendant make full payment before enrollment, I advocate
for more flexibility during the diversionary period rather than stringent
up-front payment.
In short, I subscribe to a model of diversion that prohibits the victim’s
veto over whether the defendant can participate and refrains from impos-
ing full payment of restitution up front as a condition of participation.
Both requirements seem to tip the scales in favor of retribution and full
prosecution, thereby undermining recent efforts to limit the reach of the
criminal legal system.11 Moreover, victim veto and restitution require-
ments introduce arbitrariness, based on either victim attitude (taste for
compassion versus taste for revenge) or defendant wealth (financial abil-
ity versus inability to pay the full amount immediately). Neither form of
arbitrariness is acceptable, particularly in an era when we are seeking av-
enues to increase fairness and transparency in decision-making and to de-
crease the impact of the legal system on already-disadvantaged
communities. For those reasons, I conclude that while victims’ interests
ought to be considered when diversion programs are created and prose-
cutors ought to consult with victims before offering diversion, we should
limit the degree to which victims can influence the allocation of diversion
resources among the offender population.
II. THE DIVERSION LANDSCAPE IN THE UNITED STATES
Formalized programs to divert potential defendants out of the criminal
courts and into treatment or community service emerged in the United
bibliography on the subject, see Jean M. Callihan, Victim Impact Statements in Capital Tri-
als: A Selected Bibliography, 88 CORNELL L. REV. 569 (2003).
11. These efforts were initiated once policymakers acknowledged that “bars can’t
build better men,” STUART TURTON, THE 7 1/2 DEATHS OF EVELYN HARDCASTLE 436
(2018), and are too costly to provide so little in return on the recidivism front, see Robert
E. Wright, Reducing Recidivism 3–4 (Nov. 18, 2020) (unpublished manuscript), available at
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3733040 [https://perma.cc/B2TU-
DNVV].
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States in the mid-twentieth century, spurred by a 1967 report from the
President’s Commission on Law Enforcement and the Administration of
Justice.12 Judges and prosecutors collaborated to create the earliest diver-
sion programs,13 but eventually prosecutors created diversion programs
that did not involve judges at all. Judges instead took the reins on crafting
problem-solving or accountability courts for specialized issues like drug
use or criminal behavior by veterans.14
There were a few fledgling programs in the 1970s and 1980s, but the
law-and-order headwinds, fueled by media-driven fear of crime and the
War on Drugs, were overpowering, and the evaluation data from the
early programs were not encouraging.15 The idea of diversion did not
gain steam in the United States until the late 1990s and early 2000s,16
when policymakers could no longer hide from the fact that full prosecu-
tion was far too expensive of an approach for many offenders caught up
in the legal system.17 Aggressive punishment approaches relying heavily
on incarceration had squeezed the budgets of state and local governments
since the politics of law and order took hold in the 1970s.18 Such spending
might have made fiscal sense if most offenders needed this heavy-handed
approach to deter them from future law-breaking. But many offenders
respond to more moderate interventions—or sometimes need no inter-
vention at all19—thus establishing the gross inefficiency of the “full prose-
cution for everyone” model. And on the flipside, even the full-
prosecution approach was (and remains) unproven as a mechanism of
crime control—its ability to reduce re-offending has never been estab-
lished empirically.20
12. PRESIDENT’S COMM’N ON L. ENF’T & ADMIN. OF JUST., THE CHALLENGE OF
CRIME IN A FREE SOCIETY 133–34 (1967).
13. See, e.g., State v. Leonardis, 363 A.2d 321, 325 (N.J. 1976).
14. Wright & Levine, supra note 1, at 332, 336. See generally Erin R. Collins, The
Problem of Problem-Solving Courts, 54 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1573 (2021).
15. See MALCOLM M. FEELEY, COURT REFORM ON TRIAL: WHY SIMPLE SOLUTIONS
FAIL 84–87, 93–102, 105–06 (1983).
16. Diversion programs also exist in many other countries, see Wright & Levine, supra
note 1, at 338–40 (discussing programs in the United Kingdom, Western Europe, South
Africa, and Japan, for example), but the focus of this Article is on diversion programs in
the United States.
17. See MICHAEL REMPEL, MELISSA LABRIOLA, PRISCILLIA HUNT, ROBERT C. DAVIS,
WARREN A. REICH & SAMANTHA CHERNEY, NIJ’S MULTISITE EVALUATION OF PROSECU-
TOR-LED DIVERSION PROGRAMS: STRATEGIES, IMPACTS, AND COST-EFFECTIVENESS 1–2
(2018), https://www.ojp.gov/pdffiles1/nij/grants/251665.pdf [https://perma.cc/ACE5-X83T].
18. NAT’L RSCH. COUNCIL, THE GROWTH OF INCARCERATION IN THE UNITED
STATES: EXPLORING CAUSES AND CONSEQUENCES 111–13 (Jeremy Travis, Bruce Western
& Steve Redburn eds., 2014). John Pfaff has argued that prosecutors are directly to blame
because they filed more and more cases as felonies in the 1990s than ever before. JOHN F.
PFAFF, LOCKED IN: THE TRUE CAUSES OF MASS INCARCERATION—AND HOW TO
ACHIEVE REAL REFORM 73–74 (2017).
19. See John H. Laub & Robert J. Sampson, Understanding Desistance from Crime, 28
CRIME & JUST. 1, 6 (2001); FRANKLIN E. ZIMRING, AMERICAN JUVENILE JUSTICE 50–52
(2d ed. 2019).
20. See generally Wright, supra note 11, for a collection of studies documenting the
relationship between incarceration and recidivism.
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The conventional approach to criminal justice did more than just cause
a significant fiscal impact on state budgets. It also forced upon prosecu-
tors a binary choice: file a case and proceed to full prosecution, or decline
to file and let the defendant go free with no strings attached. But this
either/or proposition was too limited for a large number of the police
reports that crossed prosecutors’ desks, because the offender population
is heterogeneous when it comes to background, amenability to treatment,
and risk of causing future harm.21 Given the myriad variations in defend-
ants, “[prosecutors sought] softer approaches for those whose back-
grounds suggest[ed] that little [would be] needed to incentivize law-
abiding behavior in the future.”22 Furthermore, prosecutors came to rec-
ognize that the collateral consequences of conviction can unfairly stigma-
tize and constrain the life choices of defendants long after they have
finished serving the sentence imposed by the criminal court.23
To put it simply, what prosecutors needed was a way to shuttle minor
offenders out of the criminal legal system before trial, while still keeping
an eye on them from a short or long distance. Inspired by three bedrock
principles—compassion for the offender, proportionality in criminal jus-
tice response, and fiscal responsibility—they devised diversion programs
to do just that.24 We now have hundreds of diversion programs in county
prosecutors’ offices across the United States, covering crimes like drug
use, prostitution, theft, and DUI.25 We also have specific programs for
offenders with mental health issues and for juveniles.26 Programs for
those who commit felony offenses also exist, although they are more rare
21. Wright & Levine, supra note 1, at 334.
22. Id.
23. For example, even misdemeanor convictions, including almost all drug possession
convictions, can subject an individual to deportation; create barriers to employment, hous-
ing, and educational opportunities; and detrimentally impact a person’s ability to access
credit. Jenny Roberts, Prosecuting Misdemeanors, in OXFORD HANDBOOK OF PROSECU-
TORS AND PROSECUTION 25.1, 25.2.2 (Ronald F. Wright, Kay L. Levine & Russell M. Gold
eds. 2021); Abhay P. Aneja & Carlos Avenancio-León, No Credit for Time Served? Incar-
ceration and Credit-Driven Crime Cycles 2 (July 2020) (unpublished manuscript), https://
static1.squarespace.com/static/59dc0ec564b05fea9d3dfee3/t/5f11d977797b7f4875d36537/
1595005305683/IncarcerationAccessToCredit_v07102020.pdf [https://perma.cc/X8C7-
2QFK] (finding that “ex-convicts face a drop of between 42 to 57 points in their credit
scores, reductions in their auto loan financing of around 25 percentage points (p.p), and
declines in mortgages of around 20 p.p.”).
24. See supra note 2 and accompanying text.
25. For a sketch of crime-based programs, see REMPEL ET AL., supra note 17, at 14–23
(reviewing the Small Amount of Marijuana Program and Accelerated Misdemeanor Pro-
gram in Philadelphia, Pennsylvania; the Treatment Accountability for Safer Communities
program for drug cases in Maricopa County, Arizona; the Cook County Drug School and
the Cook County Misdemeanor Diversion Program in Chicago, Illinois; Operation de
Novo for property and drug offenses in Minneapolis, Minnesota; and a similar program in
Dallas, Texas for retail theft offenses). See also Cory R. Lepage & Jeff D. May, The
Anchorage, Alaska Municipal Pretrial Diversion Program: An Initial Assessment, 34
ALASKA L. REV. 1, 10 (2017) (highlighting a program in Anchorage, Alaska for first-time
property offenders with no history of drug or alcohol dependency).
26. See Wright & Levine, supra note 1, at 343–44 (citing sources that have evaluated
various kinds of diversion programs for juveniles and offenders with mental health
problems).
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and are usually off limits to those who commit crimes of violence.27 The
short-term goal of these programs is to have the defendant complete the
program and wipe the criminal offense from his or her record perma-
nently.28 The long-term goal is to help the defendant desist from criminal
behavior in the future, thereby improving his or her individual well-being,
as well as downsizing the financial footprint of the courts and carceral
facilities.29
Diversion programs designed and operated by prosecutors offer de-
fendants a chance to exit the legal system either before a case is filed,
post-filing but before a plea, or after a plea but before a sentence is im-
posed.30 But the gift of early exit is not a truly free one. The diversion
program imposes some responsibility on defendants for making amends
and changing their behavior: in order to have the case permanently dis-
missed, a defendant usually must complete a designated number of com-
munity service hours, submit to drug testing, pay restitution to the victim,
and/or participate in an educational program.31 This collection of require-
ments, designed by the prosecutor’s office ostensibly to help the defen-
dant make better choices in the future, is the means by which prosecutors
keep an eye on the defendants who have been diverted out. Of course,
the more components that are embedded in the diversion program, the
more challenging it is for the defendant to complete it.32 These behav-
ioral expectations and requirements make diversion distinct from declina-
tion because when charges are rejected, the individual remains free to
live his or her life without surveillance.
Diversion differs from declination in two other important ways. First,
defendants who fail to complete the program requirements may find
27. MICHELA LOWRY & ASHMINI KERODAL, CTR. FOR CT. INNOVATION, PROSECU-
TOR-LED DIVERSION: A NATIONAL SURVEY iv (2019) (reporting that just over half of the
220 jurisdictions they surveyed had programs for non-violent felonies). But see REMPEL ET
AL., supra note 17, at 24, for a description of the Cook County Felony Diversion Program,
which does include some violent felonies, and see David Noble, Executive Summary of the
Institute for Innovation in Prosecution (IIP) Diversion Roundtable, 5 CRIM. L. PRAC. 78, 87
(2020), for a description of diversion programs with restorative justice features in some of
the boroughs of New York. Extending diversion opportunities to those who commit violent
crimes is consistent with the message offered by David Sklansky in his new book, DAVID
SKLANSKY, A PATTERN OF VIOLENCE: HOW THE LAW CLASSIFIES CRIMES AND WHAT IT
MEANS FOR JUSTICE (2021).
28. See LOWRY & KERODAL, supra note 27, at 16. However, even an arrest that is later
dismissed might still be listed on a state’s public criminal records database, searchable by a
potential employer or landlord. MARINA DUANE, NANCY LA VIGNE, MATHEW LYNCH &
EMILY REIMAL, CRIMINAL BACKGROUND CHECKS: IMPACT ON EMPLOYMENT AND RECIDI-
VISM 6 (2017).
29. See LOWRY & KERODAL, supra note 27, at 16.
30. See Erica McWhorter & David LaBahn, Confronting the Elephants in the Court-
room Through Prosecutor Led Diversion Efforts, 79 ALB. L. REV. 1221, 1226 (2016).
31. LOWRY & KERODAL, supra note 27, at 18.
32. Because the program components can be onerous, one commentator has referred
to them as akin to “probation before trial.” Note, Pretrial Diversion from the Criminal
Process, 83 YALE L.J. 827, 843 (1974). Another has warned that when program compo-
nents do not track program objectives, they risk becoming a form of “correctional quack-
ery.” EDWARD J. LATESSA, SHELLEY L. JOHNSON & DEBORAH KOETZLE, WHAT WORKS
(AND DOESN’T) IN REDUCING RECIDIVISM 79 (2d ed. 2020).
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themselves back on the court’s docket for full prosecution, and the results
of full prosecution at that point might be harsher than what the defendant
might have originally faced.33 Second, when jurisdictions create diversion
programs, police officers sometimes end up making more arrests for
divertible offenses than they otherwise would have because they need to
do their part to keep the programs in business.34 These patterns have led
to accusations that diversion programs widen the net of criminal justice
intervention35—they motivate and provide tools for the legal system to
identify and monitor offenders who otherwise would have been left to go
about their business unhindered.
Irrespective of these concerns, prosecutors tend to think of diversion as
a gift, albeit with strings attached. Because it is a gift, not every offender
is given the chance to receive it. Prosecutors design eligibility criteria for
such programs,36 which typically include severity ceilings for the crime
alleged and proof of no substantial criminal record.37 Among those who
meet the technical eligibility requirements, only those determined “suita-
ble” will be offered diversion, because prosecutors want to make sure
that a defendant has a reasonable chance to take full advantage of the gift
before they offer it.
The eligibility rules and the suitability screens appear objectively neu-
tral, but a closer inspection reveals their embrace of and tendency to rein-
force certain troubling patterns. First, these screens funnel the most likely
success stories into the program while keeping higher-risk populations
out.38 In so doing, they embody a form of selection bias that helps to
create the impression that the program itself generates a reduction in re-
cidivism. In other words, prosecutors want the cream of the crop to par-
33. Lynne Roberts & David Indermaur, Timely Intervention or Trapping Minnows?
The Potential for a Range of Net-Widening Effects in Australian Drug Diversion Initiatives,
13 PSYCHIATRY, PSYCH. & L. 220, 227 (2006) (“[S]anctions imposed during the course of
the ‘treatment’ may exceed the likely sentence. . . . In some cases, the accumulation of
sanctions . . . can exceed the length of sentence that may initially have been imposed if
diversion had not occurred.”).
34. David R. Lilley, Did Drug Courts Lead to Increased Arrest and Punishment of
Minor Drug Offenses?, 34 JUST. Q. 674, 676–77 (2017).
35. See ISSA KOHLER-HAUSMANN, MISDEMEANORLAND: CRIMINAL COURTS AND SO-
CIAL CONTROL IN AN AGE OF BROKEN WINDOWS POLICING 244 (2018); Jamie S. Gorelick,
Pretrial Diversion: The Threat of Expanding Social Control, 10 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV.
180, 194 (1975); Thomas G. Blomberg, Gary R. Heald & Mark Ezell, Diversion and Net
Widening: A Cost-Savings Assessment, 10 EVAL. REV. 45, 58–59 (1986); Roberts & In-
dermaur, supra note 33, at 229; Note, supra note 32, at 836.
36. Note that, in most instances, these are not statutory rules; they are features of the
programs that prosecutors design. Wright & Levine, supra note 1, at 337.
37. Id. at 338–39 (describing eligibility standards generally and severity ceilings in par-
ticular). On the issue of prior record, see REMPEL ET AL., supra note 17, at 17. Of the
sixteen programs reviewed, all limited admission to those with no prior felony convictions.
See also NAT’L ASS’N OF PRETRIAL SERVS. AGENCIES, PRETRIAL DIVERSION IN THE 21ST
CENTURY: A NATIONAL SURVEY OF PRETRIAL DIVERSION PROGRAMS AND PRACTICES
16–17 (2009) (concluding the majority of programs surveyed were open only to defendants
with either no prior convictions or no prior felony convictions).
38. See Celesta A. Albonetti & John R. Hepburn, Prosecutorial Discretion to Defer
Criminalization: The Effects of Defendant’s Ascribed and Achieved Status Characteristics,
12 J. QUANTITATIVE CRIMINOLOGY 63, 66–67 (1996).
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ticipate in the program because selectivity increases the chance that the
program can report higher levels of success (defined as lower rates of re-
arrest when compared to nonparticipants).39 But if program participants
are better poised to achieve success than those who are not invited to
participate even before the program begins, we cannot really know the
effect of the program on changing behavior. When prosecutors’ eligibility
and suitability protocols are guided by concerns for program success
rather than fairness, they also tend to tip the scales in favor of making
diversion offers to Caucasians and younger defendants.40 This is not an
allegation of intentional discrimination but rather an observation that the
program’s institutional design can cause a discriminatory effect. Persons
of color and older defendants are more likely to wash out of diversion
due to a new arrest, or to get re-arrested a short time afterwards,41
thereby tarnishing the reputation of the program. When making these
choices, prosecutors give very little thought to whether arrest patterns are
generated by policing patterns, rather than by offense behavior pat-
terns.42 Finally, fee requirements often keep diversion programs out of
reach for extremely poor defendants. Even if they are otherwise suitable,
those who cannot pay fees for classes and drug tests are routinely denied
admission.43
Suitability screens have thus come under scrutiny for unfairly keeping
out subsets of the defendant population who otherwise deserve a chance
to participate; prosecutors do not want to risk program success levels by
including offenders who are statistically more likely to get re-arrested
within a fairly short time.44 The desire for program success overrides the
desire to give certain offenders a chance to succeed. To the extent these
programs depend on a narrative that defines success as reduced rates of
re-arrest, a narrative that is central to the fiscal-responsibility founda-
tional premise of diversion itself, this result is not surprising. But it does
suggest that compassion and proportionality are subordinate founda-
tional premises, because they may be forced to yield to fiscal responsibil-
ity when there is a conflict between them.
39. The empirical evidence about the success of diversion programs is decidedly
mixed, but that topic is beyond the scope of this Article. See Wright & Levine, supra note
1, at 339.
40. See Traci Schlesinger, Racial Disparities in Pretrial Diversion: An Analysis of Out-
comes Among Men Charged with Felonies and Processed in State Courts, 3 RACE & JUST.
210, 228–29 (2013); Albonetti & Hepburn, supra note 38, at 66–67; see also Shaila Dewan
& Andrew W. Lehren, After a Crime, the Price of a Second Chance, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 12,
2016), https://www.nytimes.com/2016/12/12/us/crime-criminal-justice-reform-diversion.html
[https://perma.cc/Z7XU-T668] (noting that in the Memphis juvenile diversion program,
whites are more likely to get diversion offers than African Americans).
41. See Albonetti & Hepburn, supra note 38, at 78.
42. See id.
43. Dewan & Lehren, supra note 40; Noble, supra note 27, at 90.
44. Dewan & Lehren, supra note 40.
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III. THE VICTIMS’ RIGHTS MOVEMENT IN THE
UNITED STATES
Before our nation’s founding, when criminal law still bore strong link-
ages to tort law,45 local criminal laws were enforced by victims, and the
state’s role was limited to imposition of punishment.46 In this system of
private prosecution, a crime inflicted a debt that was owed to the victim,
and the criminal case was viewed as a mechanism to provide compensa-
tion to the victim for that debt.47 Because the victim–offender dyad was
at the center of the case, the victim had control over whether a case was
brought, including responsibility for conducting the investigation to es-
tablish the wrongdoer’s guilt.48 If victims chose to forego prosecution,
there was no public agency that would carry it forward in their name.49
But private prosecutions fell out of favor as American cities developed;
they were inefficient, victims were too inexperienced to investigate and
prosecute random actions by wrongdoers, and society writ large became
the primary holder of the debt caused by the defendant’s misbehavior.50
Public prosecutors were thus appointed and assumed control over the
power to prosecute most crimes by the start of the nineteenth century, a
model that still exists today.
With public prosecutors in charge of decision-making, victims were
forced to assume a secondary, subordinate role in prosecution.51 As the
Supreme Court stated in 1973, in a case involving failure to provide child
support, victims have no standing to file a criminal complaint:
[I]n American jurisprudence at least, a private citizen lacks a judi-
cially cognizable interest in the prosecution or nonprosecution of an-
other. . . . [G]iven the special status of criminal prosecutions in our
system, we hold that appellant has made an insufficient showing of a
direct nexus between the vindication of her interest and the enforce-
ment of the State’s criminal laws.52
45. Kay Levine & Malcolm Feeley, Prosecution, 19 INT’L ENCYCLOPEDIA SOC. &
BEHAV. SCIS. 210, 210 (2015) (citing JOHN H. LANGBEIN, PROSECUTING CRIME IN THE
RENAISSANCE: ENGLAND, GERMANY, FRANCE 225 (1974) (identifying the origins of crimi-
nal law in tort law)).
46. Douglas E. Beloof & Paul G. Cassell, The Crime Victim’s Right to Attend the Trial:
The Reascendant National Consensus, 9 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 481, 484–85 (2005); Cas-
sell & Garvin, supra note 5, at 102–03 (2020) (citing William F. McDonald, Towards a
Bicentennial Revolution in Criminal Justice: The Return of the Victim, 13 AM. CRIM. L.
REV. 649 (1976)).
47. See Blanco, supra note 7, at 394.
48. Id.
49. See id. at 394–95.
50. Id. at 395–96; Henning, supra note 9, at 1110 (citing PEGGY M. TOBOLOWSKY,
CRIME VICTIM RIGHTS AND REMEDIES 5–6 (2001)); Cassell & Garvin, supra note 5, at
102–03 (first citing STEPHANOS BIBAS, THE MACHINERY OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE (2012);
then citing Abraham S. Goldstein, Defining the Role of the Victim in Criminal Prosecution,
52 MISS. L.J. 515, 549 (1982)).
51. Some commentators link the diminished status of victims to a system-wide empha-
sis on offender rehabilitation in the 1950s and 1960s. See, e.g., Albert R. Roberts, Victim/
Witness Programs: Questions and Answers, 61 FBI L. ENF’T BULL. 12, 13 (1992).
52. Linda R.S. v. Richard D., 410 U.S. 614, 619 (1973).
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In a public prosecution scheme that defines society as the holder of the
debt (and thus the only holder of a judicially cognizable interest), victims
are limited to the role of witness; they can speak from the witness stand
or when seeking restitution for damages suffered, but at no other point.
In this capacity victims sometimes feel traumatized by the legal system
itself, over and above what they suffered at the hands of their alleged
assailants—whether by police who ignore or downplay their calls for
help, by prosecutors who disregard them, or by defense attorneys who
subject them to stinging cross-examination.53 Moreover, once limited to
the role of witness, the victim can no longer steer the case; a victim’s
input will be sought only as a courtesy by a prosecutor who is inclined to
ask for it.54 In this environment, many victims believe the legal system
expresses only “institutionalized disinterest” with respect to their needs
and concerns.55 Victims who want more involvement can file civil lawsuits
for damages, but to do so they need to hire their own attorneys.56
Starting in the mid-twentieth century, this state of affairs struck many
displaced victims as deeply unsatisfying,57 leading them to form a social
movement in support of victims’ rights. Paul Cassell and Margaret Garvin
report that adherents hailed from diverse segments of society, including
those striving for women’s rights, civil rights, and increased law and order
in the nation.58 That Victims’ Rights Movement gained momentum
through the 1970s and 1980s59 fueled by increased media attention on
crime and criminals, which in turn drove up rates of fear of crime among
the American public.60 Well-publicized horrific crimes against children in
the 1980s, though extremely rare, coupled with the Reagan Administra-
53. Roberts, supra note 51, at 13.
54. See Levine & Feeley, supra note 45, at 210–11 (describing the shift from private
prosecution to public prosecution in the U.S. and in other nations, and the vestiges of
private prosecution that remain in various nations).
55. Blanco, supra note 7, at 396 (quoting PRESIDENT’S TASK FORCE ON VICTIMS OF
CRIME, FINAL REPORT vi (1982)).
56. Id. at 395–96 (citing Juan Cardenas, The Crime Victim in the Prosecutorial Process,
9 HARV. J. L. & PUB. POL’Y 357, 371–72 (1986)).
57. See Henning, supra note 9, at 1110 (citing TOBOLOWSKY, supra note 50, at 7)
(“[A]ctivists complained that victims had no voice in the prosecutorial process, were not
being treated with sensitivity and respect by police and prosecutors, and were not being
provided with adequate restitution or services . . . .”).
58. Cassell & Garvin, supra note 5, at 103; see also John P. J. Dussich, Teaching Vic-
timology in America: From on the Job Training (OJT) to PhD, 25 J. CRIM. JUST. EDUC.
486, 487 (2014) (describing the social events that “contributed to the heightened public and
academic awareness of crime victimization,” including the post-war baby boom, the crime
wave of the 1960s and 70s, the civil rights and feminist movements, the Vietnam War, and a
renewed emphasis on social problems by the federal Law Enforcement Assistance
Administration).
59. The Victims’ Rights Movement was also international in scope, as many human
rights instruments adopted during this period addressed the rights of crime victims. HUM.
RTS. WATCH, MIXED RESULTS: US POLICY AND INTERNATIONAL STANDARDS ON THE
RIGHTS AND INTERESTS OF VICTIMS OF CRIME 9–10 (2008), https://www.hrw.org/report/
2008/09/23/mixed-results/us-policy-and-international-standards-rights-and-interests-victims
[https://perma.cc/EE8N-K6ZB].
60. Blanco, supra note 7, at 396–97.
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tion’s War on Drugs,61 kept crime constantly on the public agenda, just as
support for rehabilitation programs waned. Furthermore, the efforts of
the Warren Court to expand procedural protections for criminal offend-
ers produced a backlash in succeeding decades, some of which centered
on the need for victims to have rights too.62
In terms of policy achievements, the Victims’ Rights Movement can
point to a remarkable number of successes. Those successes began on the
West Coast in 1965, when California created the first victim compensa-
tion fund.63 Seven years later, Bay Area Women Against Rape was
founded in San Francisco to provide victim services.64 Today, every state
has a victims’ compensation fund, and there are thousands of victim ser-
vice agencies across the country.65 Just under 20% of those agencies are
housed within prosecutors’ offices,66 an approach that began with grants
from the federal Law Enforcement Assistance Administration in the
1970s67 but that today is supported largely through state and local fund-
ing, as well as penalty assessments on convicted offenders.68 Victim and
witness assistance bureaus in prosecutors’ offices tend to be run by pro-
fessionals who hold college degrees in criminal justice, sociology, or coun-
seling; some units are staffed by personnel who used to hold secretarial or
administrative positions within the prosecutor’s office before moving into
the specialized bureau.69 Irrespective of the staffing model, these bureaus
encourage and facilitate witness cooperation with the prosecution from
filing to testifying, advise of court dates and continuances, and assist with
reimbursement for costs incurred due to the crime.70
In addition to innovating direct service and support models for victims,
California led the way in expanding its formal law to offer victims the
61. Andrew Glass, Reagan Declares “War on Drugs,” October 14, 1982, POLITICO
(Oct. 14, 2010, 4:44 AM), https://www.politico.com/story/2010/10/reagan-declares-war-on-
drugs-october-14-1982-043552 [https://perma.cc/38K6-3PCX].
62. Blanco, supra note 7, at 397.
63. Adams & Osborne, supra note 3, at 675.
64. Id.
65. Id.; see also Barbara Oudekerk & Heather Warnken, Victim Service Providers in
the United States, 2017, BUREAU JUST. STAT. 1 (Nov. 2019), https://www.bjs.gov/content/
pub/pdf/vspus17.pdf [https://perma.cc/K9ZK-6PZX] (reporting that there were 12,196 vic-
tim service providers in the United States as of 2017).
66. Oudekerk & Warnken, supra note 65, at 1 (reporting that 2,220 of the 12,196 vic-
tim service providers in the United States are found in prosecutors’ offices). Prosecutor
office programs tend to be “witness oriented,” emphasizing “the importance of the victim
as a witness for the case, while outside programs tend to be “victim oriented,” providing
“services to the victim immediately after the crime occurs.” Robert A. Jerin, Laura J. Mori-
arty & Melissa A. Gibson, Victim Service or Self-Service: An Analysis of Prosecution Based
Victim-Witness Assistance Programs and Providers, 7 CRIM. JUST. POL’Y REV. 142, 143
(1995); see also Dussich, supra note 58, at 490.
67. Henning, supra note 9, at 1111 (citing TOBOLOWSKY, supra note 50, at 7) (describ-
ing the Crime Victim Initiative, established by the Law Enforcement Assistance Adminis-
tration in 1974).
68. Roberts, supra note 51, at 13–14; Jerin et al., supra note 66, at 142–43 (taking a
close look at the victim–witness program structure in the state of North Carolina, which
began via legislation in 1986).
69. Roberts, supra note 51, at 15; Jerin et al., supra note 66, at 148–50.
70. Roberts, supra note 51, at 15.
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right to participate in the criminal process. It developed the first victim
impact statement in 1974 and secured the first victims’ rights amendment,
Proposition 8, in its state constitution in 1982.71 That same year, the Presi-
dent’s Task Force on Victims of Crime gave the movement an injection of
national energy when it declared that the “oppression [of crime victims
by the justice system] must be redressed,” and then proposed a federal
constitutional amendment to protect the right of crime victims “to be pre-
sent and to be heard at all critical stages of judicial proceedings.”72
While the federal constitutional amendment was ultimately defeated,
many states followed California’s lead in changing their laws to offer vic-
tims a voice in the process. Forty-four states now have victims’ rights
amendments in their state constitutions,73 every state has a statutory vic-
tims’ bill of rights,74 and victim impact statements have received a stamp
of approval from the U.S. Supreme Court.75 At the federal level, we see
the imprint of the Victims’ Rights Movement in the Victims of Crime
Act, passed in 1984;76 the Violence Against Women Act, passed as part of
the Violent Crime Control and Law Enforcement Act of 1994;77 and the
expansion of victim services and trainings for federal law enforcement
officers concerning the fair treatment of victims.78 The passage of the An-
titerrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996,79 which radically
altered habeas corpus rights for prisoners in both state and federal
carceral facilities, grew out of the activities of victims’ rights advocates.80
71. Adams & Osborne, supra note 3, at 675. The following decade, California enacted
the first anti-stalking law. Id. at 676 (citing CAL. PENAL CODE § 646.9 (West 2008)).
72. PRESIDENT’S TASK FORCE ON VICTIMS OF CRIME, supra note 55, at 114.
73. By the end of the twentieth century, thirty-five states had constitutional provisions
and all states had statutory enactments. See Cassell & Garvin, supra note 5, at 106–07. By
this Article’s publication, nine more states had added constitutional provisions under
Marsy’s Law referenda. Similar Marsy’s Law amendments were passed by Illinois, North
Dakota, South Dakota, Ohio, Florida, Georgia, Nevada, North Carolina, and Oklahoma.
Id. at 107 nn.39–47. California adopted Marsy’s Law as Proposition 9 to amend Proposition
8, which already provided state constitutional protection for victims’ rights. Id. at 107 n.38.
74. Id. at 105.
75. See Payne v. Tennessee, 501 U.S. 808, 825 (1991).
76. 42 U.S.C. § 10606 (repealed 2004).
77. Violence Against Women Act of 1994, Pub. L. No. 103-322, 108 Stat. 1902-55
(1994) (codified as amended in scattered sections of 8, 16, 18, and 42 U.S.C.).
78. Adams & Osborne, supra note 3, at 680 (discussing activities of the Office for
Victims of Crime (OVC)). These efforts built upon the Law Enforcement Assistance Ad-
ministration grants to prosecutors’ offices in the 1970s to develop victim/witness assistance
bureaus. Roberts, supra note 51, at 13.
79. Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-132, 110
Stat. 1214 (1996) (codified as amended in scattered sections of 8, 18, 22, 28, and 42 U.S.C.);
Adams & Osborne, supra note 3, at 682 (discussing efforts of OVC in securing the bill’s
passage). As a result of this bill, OVC was able to create a reserve fund to support assis-
tance to states in the event of domestic terrorism or events of mass violence. That fund
provided support to the victims of the Oklahoma City courthouse bombing and victims of
the Columbine High School shooting, as well as to victims of terrorist attacks that occurred
on foreign soil. Id.
80. Scholars have recently classified these activities under the heading of “carceral
feminism,” a term first coined by Elizabeth Bernstein to denote the emphasis on law en-
forcement strategies to address issues of sexual assault and domestic violence. See Eliza-
beth Bernstein, The Sexual Politics of The New Abolitionism, 18 DIFFERENCES: J. FEMINIST
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Taking a closer look at the state-level constitutional and statutory pro-
visions enacted in recent decades, several features are common across
jurisdictions.81 These enactments typically declare that victims have a
right to receive notice of criminal proceedings, a right to attend or partici-
pate in those proceedings, a right to receive restitution, and a right to
offer a victim impact statement before a sentence is imposed.82 The pro-
ceedings covered include most prominently, but not exclusively, bail and
pretrial release hearings, the criminal trial itself, sentencing, and parole
hearings.83 Victims also have a right to receive notice when the defendant
is released or escapes from custody.84
For example, the Marsy’s Law amendment recently enacted in Flor-
ida85 gives victims, upon request: (1) “The right . . . to be present at all
public proceedings involving the criminal conduct, including but not lim-
ited, to trial, plea, sentencing, or adjudication, even if the victim will be a
witness at the proceeding, notwithstanding any rule to the contrary”;86 (2)
“The right to be heard in any public proceeding involving pretrial or
other release from any form of legal constraint, plea, sentencing, adjudi-
cation, or parole, and any proceeding during which a right of the victim is
implicated”;87 and (3) “The right to confer with the prosecuting attorney
concerning any plea agreements” or regarding “release, restitution, sen-
tencing, or any other disposition of the case.”88 Florida victims also have
CULTURAL STUD. 128–51 (2007). For recent contributors to the conversation about the
reach, implications, and contradictions of carceral feminism, see Anna Terwiel, What Is
Carceral Feminism?, 48 POL. THEORY 421 (2020), and AYA GRUBER, THE FEMINIST WAR
ON CRIME: THE UNEXPECTED ROLE OF WOMEN’S LIBERATION IN MASS INCARCERATION
(2020).
81. See Henning, supra note 9, at 1111 (describing the “typical victims’ rights statute”).
82. Id. at 1117–18.
83. The right to attend the criminal trial sometimes conflicts with the defendant’s right
to due process, which allows for the exclusion of witnesses before their testimony is taken.
See Mosteller, supra note 4, at 457. The due process protection ensures that later witnesses
cannot shape their testimony to match the testimony of prior witnesses. See id. Prosecutors
can avoid this tension by having the victim testify first. Id.; see also Henning, supra note 9,
at 1154 (describing various ways in which putative victims’ rights might compromise the
rights of defendants).
84. Henning, supra note 9, at 1117.
85. Not all victims’ rights advocates have been supportive of Marsy’s Law constitu-
tional amendments. See, e.g, Laurie Schipper & Beth Barnhill, We’re Victims’ Rights Advo-
cates, and We Opposed Marsy’s Law, ACLU (May 16, 2018, 10:45 AM), https://
www.aclu.org/blog/criminal-law-reform/were-victims-rights-advocates-and-we-opposed-
marsys-law [https://perma.cc/WW9Z-8QRK]. Moreover, some percentage of victims would
like the criminal legal system to focus more broadly on rehabilitation over punishment.
ALL. FOR SAFETY & JUST., supra note 6, at 15 (reporting that victims expressed a prefer-
ence for rehabilitation over punishment by a two-to-one margin). Victims who would like
the prosecutor’s office to take a softer approach—to offer diversion to a defendant where
the program guidelines don’t allow it based on the defendant’s crime or criminal history—
are likely to be told that their only chance for input is at the sentencing hearing following
conviction.
86. FLA. CONST. art. I, § 16(b)(6)(a). Cassell and Garvin note that this provision, as
well as the others following, is similar to the language found in “many other states’ consti-
tutional and statutory provisions,” as well as provisions of federal law, such as the Violence
Against Women Act and 18 U.S.C. § 3771(a)(1). Cassell & Garvin, supra note 5, at 109.
87. Id. § 16(b)(6)(b).
88. Id. § 16(b)(6)(c).
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“[t]he right to proceedings free from unreasonable delay, and to a prompt
and final conclusion of the case and any related postjudgment proceed-
ings”89—a right that might squarely conflict with defense or prosecution
requests for continuances in furtherance of better preparation—and a
“right . . . to be reasonably protected from the accused and any person
acting on behalf of the accused.”90 The amendment further promises vic-
tims that their welfare will be taken into account by the judge when set-
ting bail or pretrial release conditions;91 that they will receive
“reasonable, accurate, and timely notice” of the offender’s release or es-
cape;92 and that the scope of protection from the defendant extends be-
yond physical violence to include “intimidation, harassment, and
abuse.”93 Finally, the amendment assures victims that they have a “right
to full and timely restitution in every case and from each convicted of-
fender for all losses suffered, both directly and indirectly, by the victim as
a result of the criminal conduct,”94 thereby imposing joint and several
liability on all co-defendants for all losses. Notably, Florida courts have
long recognized that defendants who cannot pay the full amount, despite
bona fide efforts to do so, are required “to pay only as much as they can
reasonably afford.”95
While the rights listed are quite extensive, the remedies for violations
of these provisions, whether statutory or constitutional, are often more
illusory than real.96 For example, under Florida’s Marsy’s Law victims do
not have the ability to get a defendant’s conviction or sentence reversed
or declared null simply because they were excluded from the proceedings.
Further, victims do not have the right to obtain money damages for a
rights violation committed by the court or prosecutor, nor can victims
seek writs of mandamus to force trial courts to take their feelings into
account during sentencing. In the absence of real remedies, the “institu-
tionalized disinterest” of prior decades may have been transformed into
benign neglect by judges and prosecutors who were too busy or too dis-
tracted to give victims their due.97 Florida sought to address these en-
89. Id. § 16(b)(10).
90. Id. § 16(b)(3).
91. Id. § 16(b)(4).
92. Id. § 16(b)(6)(a).
93. Id. § 16(b)(2).
94. Id. § 16(b)(9).
95. Cassell & Garvin, supra note 5, at 131 (citing Bourget v. State, 634 So. 2d 1109,
1110 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1994)).
96. Id. at 105 (noting that many state statutes and constitutional amendments “lacked
effective enforcement mechanisms to ensure that victims’ rights were fully implemented”).
97. See Mosteller, supra note 4, at 449 (“[O]fficials fail to honor victims’ rights largely
as a result of inertia, past learning, insensitivity to the unfamiliar needs of victims, lack of
training, and inadequate or misdirected institutional incentives.”); Laurence H. Tribe &
Paul G. Cassell, Embed the Rights of Victims in the Constitution, L.A. TIMES (July 6, 1998,
12:00 AM), https://www.latimes.com/archives/la-xpm-1998-jul-06-me-1150-story.html
[https://perma.cc/D5ZR-WXZA] (noting that enactments “come into conflict with bureau-
cratic habit, traditional indifference, [or] sheer inertia”). Gillis and Beloof contend that
because prosecutors “represent the people of their state, not the individual crime victim,”
we ought not to expect prosecutorial enforcement of victim rights. John W. Gillis & Doug-
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forcement issues by authorizing victims, their attorneys, and prosecutors
to “assert and seek enforcement of the rights enumerated . . . as a matter
of right” and giving them standing to do so.98 South Dakota has done so
by authorizing the creation of a “Marsy’s Card” to be given to victims of
crime by police.99 Whether those pronouncements are sufficient to over-
come bureaucratic and professional inertia remains to be seen.
IV. THE COLLISION COURSE BETWEEN DIVERSION AND
VICTIMS’ RIGHTS
While the Victims’ Rights Movement has made notable advances to
change the public face of crime victim involvement in the legal system, it
has not fundamentally changed the Supreme Court’s declaration that vic-
tims have no “judicially cognizable interest” in the prosecution or nonp-
rosecution of a given case.100 In light of that status, how should
prosecutors account for victim interests in the pursuit or non-pursuit of
diversion? The hallmark of the Victims’ Rights Movement is the assertion
that victims should not be ignored, but their interests and opinions might
run counter to diversion program interests in fiscal responsibility, propor-
tionality across cases, and compassion for low-level offenders. They might
even prioritize retribution at the expense of all other goals. In the event
of a conflict, should victim interests be permitted to undercut the systemic
interests that support diversion?
There are two primary areas in which victim concerns might emerge
and potentially conflict with the principles that underlie diversion pro-
grams. The first issue is victim input into the diversion offer. As discussed
in Part II, prosecutors design eligibility standards for their diversion pro-
grams and then subject all eligible defendants to suitability review to limit
the number of defendants who can take advantage of diversion, thereby
increasing the likelihood of program success.101 The question here is
whether the victim ought to be consulted as part of that eligibility or suit-
ability review process, and more importantly, whether prosecutors ought
to regard the victim’s consent to diversion as a necessary predicate to
making the diversion offer. The second issue is restitution—if the of-
fender’s crime has caused damage to the victim’s property, loss of money,
or injury, the victim is entitled to restitution. That restitution amount or-
dinarily would be ordered as a term of the sentence if the case were fully
prosecuted and a conviction resulted; in fact, right to restitution has been
las E. Beloof, The Next Step for a Maturing Victim Rights Movement: Enforcing Crime
Victim Rights in the Courts, 33 MCGEORGE L. REV. 689, 695 (2002). In fact, prosecutors
may be legally precluded from representing the victim due to state standing doctrines;
because victim advocates typically work for the prosecutor’s office, they would be similarly
constrained. Id.
98. FLA. CONST. art. I, § 16(c).
99. S.D. CONST. art. VI, § 29, cl. 19 (describing the Marsy’s Card).
100. Linda R.S. v. Richard D., 410 U.S. 614, 619 (1973).
101. See supra Part II.
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a mainstay of the Victims’ Rights Movement, as discussed in Part III.102
But the whole point of diversion is to avoid the regular adjudicatory pro-
cess and to have the case end short of conviction. For that reason, the
question of how victims will be compensated for their losses when the
case ends in diversion must be considered. I discuss each of those issues
in turn below.
A. VICTIM INPUT INTO THE DIVERSION OFFER
In this Section, I consider the extent to which prosecutors should listen
to the victim when deciding whether to offer diversion to an otherwise
eligible defendant. The Victims’ Rights Movement has endeavored to
make consultation with victims a regular part of prosecution practice. Re-
call the language of Florida’s Marsy’s Law, discussed in Part III: the vic-
tim has “[t]he right to confer with the prosecuting attorney concerning
any plea agreements” and case resolution.103 But diversion is neither a
plea agreement nor a case resolution; it is the path by which the defen-
dant avoids those outcomes and is given a second chance. Ought the vic-
tim have a say in whether diversion is offered to or withheld from an
eligible defendant? If the victim refuses to consent, should the prosecutor
take diversion off the table?
At first glance this might not seem like much of an actual problem
because jurisdictions have established diversion programs mostly to pro-
vide an alternative for persons who are accused of low-level offenses that
have no specific victims, such as drug offenses, prostitution, or driving
offenses. In the absence of a specific victim advocating for his or her
rights, one might conclude that the risk of a collision between diversion
and an assertive victim is almost nonexistent. That conclusion would un-
derestimate the risk for three reasons. First, even in crime-category-based
programs, diversion is not exclusively limited to victimless crimes. Some
jurisdictions provide diversion for various forms of theft, which is a vic-
tim-based offense,104 and others extend diversion to certain felony of-
fenses with victims.105 Moreover, drug offenders often come into drug
diversion for drug-related offenses (offenses committed to support the
drug user’s consumption),106 and many of those offenses have victims.
102. See supra Part III.
103. FLA. CONST. art. I, § 16(b)(6)(c).
104. See REMPEL ET AL., supra note 17, at 17 (reviewing a program for property and
drug offenses in Minneapolis and a similar program in Dallas for retail theft offenses);
Lepage & May, supra note 25, at 12 (reviewing a program for first-time property offenders
in Anchorage).
105. See LOWRY & KERODAL, supra note 27, at 14–15.
106. Daniela Barberi & Faye S. Taxman, Diversion and Alternatives to Arrest: A Quali-
tative Understanding of Police and Substance Users’ Perspective, 49 J. DRUG ISSUES 703,
705 (“Substance users typically engage in a range of criminal behaviors to support their
habits and/or lifestyles such as drug use, possession of paraphernalia, public urination,
petty thefts, property crimes, and shoplifting.”). Andrea Yatsco and her colleagues simi-
larly identify the connection between drug use and crime: “Justice-involved individuals are
overrepresented within substance abuse disorder (SUD) treatment when compared to the
general population . . . .” Andrea J. Yatsco, Rachel D. Garza, Tiffany Champagne-Lan-
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Lastly, the programs geared toward juveniles and those with mental
health disorders address all kinds of offenses, including those with tradi-
tional victims.107 Hence, the number of victims who might influence the
frequency and distribution of diversion resources is far greater than the
program labels alone would suggest.108
Having established that some number of potential diversion cases will
involve victims, the next step is to decide the proper level of victim input.
It could range from the prosecutor providing the victim advance notice
that a diversion offer will be made to the defendant (notice schemes), to
the prosecutor offering the victim a chance to weigh in on that offer
before it is communicated (consultation schemes), or even to the prosecu-
tor needing the victim’s consent before making the offer, thus granting
the victim a veto if she disagrees (veto schemes). In veto schemes, a vic-
tim who withholds consent effectively keeps an otherwise eligible and
suitable offender from being able to participate in diversion, thus sending
him down the full prosecution track. The level of victim input in the di-
version decision might be a feature of the state statute authorizing diver-
sion generally, or it might be a feature of the particular diversion program
created by the prosecutor’s office.109
Notice and consultation schemes fully embrace the message of the Vic-
tims’ Rights Movement and ought to be supported. They treat the victim
with dignity and respect because they acknowledge that, even without a
gabeer & James R. Langabeer, Alternatives to Arrest for Illicit Opioid Use: A Joint Crimi-
nal Justice and Healthcare Treatment Collaboration, SUBSTANCE ABUSE: RSCH. &
TREATMENT 1, 1 (2020).
The correlation between substance abuse and criminality has also been observed by po-
lice officers in rural Illinois: “Frequent flyers come in all the time for not only drug-related
crimes but associated crimes and it wasn’t stopping and the population was growing . . .
[When we started to] take a couple of these people to treatment . . . . some of these other
crimes, along with the drug crimes, start[ed] slowing down around our area.” JESSICA
REICHERT, LILY GLEICHER, LYNNE MOCK, SHARYN ADAMS & KIMBERLY LOPEZ, POLICE-
LED REFERRALS TO TREATMENT FOR SUBSTANCE USE DISORDERS IN RURAL ILLINOIS 21
(2017).
107. For a sample of the literature about juvenile and mental health programs, see gen-
erally Craig S. Schwalbe, Robin E. Gearing, Michael J. Mackenzie, Kathryne B. Brewer &
Rawan Ibrahim, A Meta-Analysis of Experimental Studies of Diversion Programs for Juve-
nile Offenders, 32 CLINICAL PSYCH. REV. 26 (2011); Holly A. Wilson & Robert D. Hoge,
The Effect of Youth Diversion Programs on Recidivism: A Meta-Analytic Review, 40 CRIM.
JUST. & BEHAV. 497 (2013); Francis Pakes & Jane Winstone, Effective Practice in Mental
Health Diversion and Liaison, 48 HOW. J. 158 (2009); Alexander J. Cowell, Nahama
Broner & Randolph Dupont, The Cost-Effectiveness of Criminal Justice Diversion Pro-
grams for People with Serious Mental Illness Co-Occurring with Substance Abuse, 20 J.
CONTEMP. CRIM. JUST. 292 (2004).
108. Even for crimes we think of as “victimless,” sometimes the neighborhood is invited
to comment on the impact of the defendant’s behavior generally. Henning, supra note 9, at
1145, 1164.
109. See, e.g., OKLA. STAT. tit. 22, § 991f-1.1(B)(3)(g) (2009) (providing that the vic-
tim’s position on diversion should be taken into account during eligibility determination);
Pretrial Diversion: About the Program, COBB CNTY. GOV’T, https://www.cobbcounty.org/
courts/district-attorney/pretrial-diversion [https://perma.cc/526T-WH6Y] (providing that
the victim’s response to a defendant’s petition for diversion will be considered at the eligi-
bility stage, along with the nature of the crime and the defendant’s criminal history).
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legally cognizable interest in the case,110 the victim has an actual interest
in the case. Diversion, if successful, results in no conviction and no pun-
ishment for the alleged offender, an outcome that might upset the victim.
Moreover, a defendant who receives diversion will be living out in the
community while fulfilling the terms of the program, and the community-
based treatment setting may put some victims on edge. For both of these
reasons, victims need to know up front that diversion is being considered,
and they should be consulted about whether the person who caused harm
ought to be (1) given the chance to resolve the case without punishment
and (2) released back into the community while doing service or educa-
tion work in support of rehabilitation. Surely not every victim will have
an opinion, and surely not every victim with an opinion will oppose these
goals, but prosecutors ought not to assume that they know the victim’s
perspective. Prosecutors need to ask questions, and they need to listen
carefully as victims express their opinions. In short, while giving the vic-
tim notice and an opportunity to confer on the issue of diversion might
not appear in the language of statutory or constitutional provisions ad-
dressing victims’ rights,111 it is fully consistent with their spirit.
Veto schemes are a different animal altogether. Prosecutors should not
allow the victim’s opinion to control their decision making. In our land-
scape of public prosecution, we trust public officials to make decisions of
consequence because they are presumed to be professional and disinter-
ested.112 We believe that prosecutors’ disinterest—coupled with their in-
stitutional knowledge and experience across hundreds or thousands of
cases—properly calibrates their barometer of justice. Victims lack both
this level of experience and this objectivity, and thus are likely to either
over- or under-estimate how bad this crime (or offender) is when com-
pared to other crimes (or offenders) in the jurisdiction. As noted by Paul
Robinson, “victim influence is inconsistent with our reasons for being so
careful to have impartial judges, jurors, and prosecutors”—persons who
will “not be swayed by a personal stake in [the outcome]”—serve as the
ultimate decision makers.113 He continues on in the context of plea bar-
gaining: “If we think a prosecutor’s personal stake in a case ought to dis-
qualify him or her, on what grounds could we justify allowing the most
110. Linda R.S. v. Richard D., 410 U.S. 614, 619 (1973).
111. Several states do mention the consultation right in connection with diversion in
their statutory schemes. See, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 11, § 9405 (West 2021) (providing
for a right to consult with the prosecutor before the prosecutor agrees to diversion); MINN.
STAT. ANN. §§ 611A.03–.0301 (West 2021) (providing for a right to object to pretrial diver-
sion); 18 PA. STAT. AND CONS. STAT. ANN. § 11.201(4) (West 2019) (providing for a right
to comment before diversion). At the federal level, the victim has the right to be informed
of a plea bargain or deferred prosecution agreement, pursuant to the Crime Victims’
Rights Act. 18 U.S.C. § 3771(a)(9). This provision requires neither up-front notification
nor time to confer with the U.S. Attorney about the decision, however. See id.
112. Bruce A. Green, Why Should Prosecutors “Seek Justice”?, 26 FORDHAM URB. L.J.
607, 614 (1999).
113. Paul H. Robinson, Should the Victims’ Rights Movement Have Influence over
Criminal Law Formulation and Adjudication?, 33 MCGEORGE L. REV. 749, 756 (2002).
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interested party—the victim—to have a veto . . . ?”114
As Professor Robinson’s comments signal, if we allow the diversion
decision to hinge on the victim’s consent, that decision may be arbitrary.
It might rest on nothing more than whether the victim is forgiving or
vengeful115 or whether the victim has the “means and the interest to ac-
tively press” his or her views on a prosecutor who disagrees.116 Victims
have sought the veto power in the context of plea offers,117 but currently
no state extends this power to individual victims when it comes to plea
agreements that the prosecutor has negotiated. Victims likewise lack the
power to force prosecutors to confer with them about their declination
decisions, although consultation with victims is often considered a wise
practice for public relations in prosecutors’ offices.118
Moreover, to the extent that the Supreme Court has validated the con-
sideration of victim impact evidence at the sentencing stage as a mecha-
nism to assess the severity of the offender’s conduct,119 these concerns
are misplaced when diversion is the issue under discussion. Diversion is
primarily a rehabilitative system, not a retributive one; yielding to victim
concerns for retribution at this juncture would upend the diversion proto-
cols that were put in place to serve other interests. The offender’s need
for and amenability to treatment or services and the system’s need to
conserve resources guide the use of diversion programs. But if we offer
the victim veto power, emotional appeals by the victim might trump the
offender’s rehabilitative potential.120
Aside from the institutional design objection, empirical work shows
that even in an era of victims’ rights, prosecutors maintain the upper hand
in the prosecutor–victim relationship through savvy communication tech-
114. Id. at 756–57.
115. Susan Bandes has cautioned that victim input can foreground vengeance and big-
otry, which then reduces the decision-maker’s ability to perceive “the essential humanity of
the defendant.” Susan Bandes, Empathy, Narrative, and Victim Impact Statements, 63 U.
CHI. L. REV. 361, 365–66 (1996).
116. Robinson, supra note 113, at 757. Concerns about the arbitrariness of victim input
were voiced by the Supreme Court in Booth v. Maryland, 482 U.S. 496, 505–06 (1987), a
case prohibiting the use of victim impact evidence in death penalty cases for due process
reasons. But Booth was overturned four years later in Payne v. Tennessee, 501 U.S. 808,
823 (1991), when the Court concluded that the factfinder should be allowed to consider
victim impact evidence as part of the moral blameworthiness of the offender.
117. See, e.g., GEORGE P. FLETCHER, WITH JUSTICE FOR SOME: VICTIMS’ RIGHTS IN
CRIMINAL TRIALS 193 (1995).
118. Zulkifl M. Zargar, Secret Faits Accomplis: Declination Decisions, Nonprosecution
Agreements, and the Crime Victim’s Right to Confer, 89 FORDHAM L. REV. 343, 375–76
(2020). Victim consent to a defendant’s access to drug court (or other problem-solving
court) presumably poses many of the same concerns, but that is beyond the scope of this
paper.
119. See Payne, 501 U.S. at 827.
120. One author describes a story from her own practice background, in which a prose-
cutor was so swayed by a victim’s narrative that she refused to dismiss a juvenile case that
clearly warranted dismissal on substantive justice grounds. Henning, supra note 9, at 1139.
She explains, “Notwithstanding her own stated doubt about the child’s need for further
services, the prosecutor felt compelled to follow the wishes of the victim, who wanted the
child not only prosecuted but incarcerated in a local detention facility.” Id.
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niques. Prosecutors often talk victims into doing what the prosecutor
wants without saying so in a straightforward manner. Work by Lisa Froh-
mann has established the following patterns of “victim management.”121
If the prosecutor wants to dismiss a case or offer a lenient plea deal to
foster early resolution, the prosecutor emphasizes to the victim the chal-
lenges of testifying, particularly during cross-examination, and sows the
seeds of concern about the victim’s safety if she presses forward.122 If the
prosecutor wants to go forward in the face of victim resistance, the prose-
cutor uses language of support and reassurance, offering to protect the
victim from the defense attorney during cross examination and to provide
witness protection outside the courthouse.123 The same approach to vic-
tim management has been shown with respect to diversion programs. In
Chicago, for example, where prosecutors are required by office policy to
get victim consent, they admit that they are able to talk the victims into
consenting without much effort.124 This evidence might suggest that we
ought not to worry about affording victims veto power over the diversion
decision because it will not ultimately prove to be much of a roadblock.
Nonetheless, enacting a right as an empty formality does not serve the
interests of justice and is likely to lead to victim dissatisfaction in the long
run.
B. RESTITUTION
Like the right to confer with the prosecutor, the victim’s right to re-
ceive restitution is traditionally tied to conviction and adjudication in the
statutory and constitutional victims’ rights provisions discussed in Part
III.125 As diversion is not conviction or adjudication, but is rather a con-
certed effort to avoid those outcomes, how should restitution be handled
in the diversion context?
State statutes and prosecutor office policies make clear that the victim’s
right to receive restitution for losses incurred as a result of the offender’s
behavior should be respected in the diversion arrangement, even though
there is no conviction for the offense.126 Because diversion is more of a
second chance than an escape from accountability, the defendant ought
not to be relieved of his restitution obligations simply because he is af-
forded a second chance through the program. The loss amount is the
same, and presumably the offender’s responsibility for causing the loss is
the same, even though he has not yet been convicted of the offense. Mak-
121. See generally Lisa Frohmann, Constituting Power in Sexual Assault Cases:
Prosecutorial Strategies for Victim Management, 45 SOC. PROBS. 393 (1998).
122. Id. at 396.
123. Id. at 396–98.
124. See Dewan & Lehren, supra note 40.
125. See, e.g., FLA. CONST. art. I, § 16(b)(9) (providing that the victim is entitled to “full
and timely restitution in every case and from each convicted offender for all losses suf-
fered, both directly and indirectly, by the victim as a result of the criminal conduct” (em-
phasis added)).
126. See id.; OR. REV. STAT. ANN. § 137.108 (West 2013); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 22,
§ 991f-1.1 (West 2021); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 13.40.080 (West 2018).
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ing the victim whole may even be an important part of the rehabilitative
effort. However, the means by which restitution is collected can vary sig-
nificantly between jurisdictions, with differing impacts on a defendant’s
ability to participate in diversion at all.
A program might require the defendant to make periodic restitution
payments during the diversionary period. This is the approach adopted in
Oregon127 and Oklahoma128 and in the city of Tucson, Arizona,129 for
example. A program might further address what will happen if the diver-
sionary period ends before a balance is paid in full. In the state of Wash-
ington, for instance, the defendant must pay restitution as a term of
diversion, but if at the end of the diversionary period there remains an
unpaid balance, the court will enter an order giving the defendant ten
years from the end of the diversion program to pay it off.130
At the extreme, a program might require the defendant to pay the full
amount of restitution up front, such that inability to pay renders ineligible
a defendant who otherwise meets the criteria for the program based on
offense and criminal history. Such a system is currently in effect in Cobb
County, Georgia, where payment of the entire restitution amount up
front is a formal condition of eligibility in the program designed by the
prosecutor’s office.131 This payment requirement is contained in a provi-
sion on the prosecutor’s office website that otherwise addresses adminis-
trative fees of the program, drug screening costs, and reimbursement for
appointed counsel, if applicable.132 The program statement mentions that
the administrative fees might be paid in installments if approved by the
program coordinator, but makes no such reference to the restitution
amount.133
The full-payment-up-front approach does have several benefits. It elim-
inates uncertainty for the victim about whether he or she will ever be
reimbursed. It also eliminates the risk of delay because full reimburse-
ment comes immediately. Moreover, the offender’s willingness to pay the
full amount up front demonstrates a high level of commitment to the pro-
gram, which may be a strong indicator of likely success later on.
But the downsides of the full-payment-up-front approach are deeply
troubling. First and foremost, it discriminates against poor defendants
and those who live paycheck-to-paycheck because these defendants are
simply unable to pay large sums all at once. In so doing, it keeps them
from being able to take advantage of the second chance that diversion
provides to wealthier defendants. Poor defendants might be very strong
candidates for the program based on enthusiasm, personal commitment,
127. OR. REV. STAT. ANN. § 137.108 (West 2013).
128. OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 22, § 991f-1.1(F)(1) (2021).
129. Prosecutor’s Office: Diversion, CITY OF TUCSON, https://www.tucsonaz.gov/prose-
cutor/diversion [https://perma.cc/KRL3-CD4S].
130. WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 13.40.080(5)(c) (West 2018).
131. Pretrial Diversion: About the Program, supra note 109.
132. Id.
133. Id.
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and family support, but lack of cash will prevent them from being consid-
ered. The wealth of a defendant should not determine his or her access to
leniency,134 particularly given the range of collateral consequences
postconviction.135
Secondly, because so many defendants fall into this disadvantaged
group, most victims will not receive their money (at least not in a timely
fashion) if we insist on up-front payment. Defendants who are deemed
ineligible for financial reasons will have their cases put on the regular
court calendar, some of them will be remanded to custody, and it may
take months or years for their cases to resolve. In the meantime, victims
won’t receive a dime. If the case finally ends in conviction, the court will
order restitution, but it may take months or years for defendants to make
payments, especially if they end up serving jail time.136 And data shows
that most restitution awards are never paid in full as a term of proba-
tion137 because most defendants still do not have the means to pay. If
diversion excludes all of those who do not have a lump sum of money at
the ready, many victims will be forced to wait for months or years to
receive money that has been ordered but is not forthcoming.
Finally, establishing full-payment-up-front requirements for eligibility
further exacerbates the selection bias described in Part II.138 Wealthier
defendants come to diversion opportunities with more resources to suc-
ceed in the program than do poorer defendants. If only wealthy defend-
ants are admitted to programs because of this screening device, then
prosecutors have effectively put their thumbs on the scales to ensure pro-
gram success; they have created a greater likelihood of establishing pro-
gram success by choosing only those participants who are already well
positioned to achieve success. In other words, a program that enrolls only
wealthy defendants tells us very little about the effect of the treatment
(i.e., the program) on changing the long-term behavior of the defendants.
Payment plans for restitution are a common feature of post-adjudica-
tion court orders, even in the wake of Marsy’s Law constitutional amend-
134. See United States v. Kuhlman, 711 F.3d 1321, 1329 (11th Cir. 2013) (finding an
abuse of discretion where the trial court gave a defendant a downward departure for full
payment of $3 million in restitution, because it offered a reduced sentence to the defendant
merely because he could pay this amount quickly).
135. See Aneja & Avenacio-León, supra note 23, at 44.
136. See Bruce Western, The Impact of Incarceration on Wage Mobility and Inequality,
67 AM. SOCIO. REV. 526, 527 (2002) (documenting the effects of incarceration on earning
capacity).
137. Data suggests restitution orders are rarely paid in full. U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABIL-
ITY OFF., GAO-18-203, FEDERAL CRIMINAL RESTITUTION: MOST DEBT IS OUTSTANDING
AND OVERSIGHT OF COLLECTIONS COULD BE IMPROVED 22–23 (2018) (noting most of
outstanding debt is uncollectable due to offenders’ inability to pay); OFFICE FOR VICTIMS
OF CRIME, U.S. DEP’T OF JUST., NEW DIRECTIONS FROM THE FIELD: VICTIMS’ RIGHTS AND
SERVICES FOR THE 21ST CENTURY 357 (1998); Restitution, W. DIST. OF N.Y., https://
www.justice.gov/usao-wdny/restitution [https://perma.cc/C67Y-KN2S] (commenting specif-
ically on defendant’s inability to pay while incarcerated).
138. See supra Part II.
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ments.139 Courts recognize that defendants should be expected to pay
only as much as they can reasonably afford. Recent efforts toward bail
reform and limiting the use of fines and fees point in a similar direction:
offenders should not be disadvantaged based on ability to pay, lest we
risk turning our jails into debtors’ prisons.140 The growth of victim com-
pensation schemes recognizes this fact; they provide funds to victims to
reimburse costs using tax dollars or court-assessed fees rather than re-
quiring the defendant to pay directly.141 What is more, policymakers are
increasingly admitting the detrimental effects of criminal convictions on
earning capacity—the very thing that diversion aims to prevent—which
would impede the defendant’s ability to reimburse the victim for the
damage caused.142 For all of these reasons, a program that makes second
chances available only to the wealthiest defendants is not truly committed
to compassion, fiscal responsibility, or proportionality.143
The bottom line is this: if we make full payment of restitution a term of
diversion eligibility, rather than a feature of the program itself, we estab-
lish a system in which opportunity for mercy is determined, first and fore-
most, by wealth. This approach undermines diversion’s principal aim of
creating a pathway out of the legal system in order to provide proportion-
ate, fiscally responsible, and compassionate services to a large portion of
the offender population. Moreover, in a system where diversion is tied to
up-front payment, the number of cases funneled out of the system will be
dramatically reduced, the number of victims who receive compensation
will be limited, and our ability to gauge the effectiveness of the program
itself will be curtailed. The embroidery of “respect for victims” created by
139. Cassell & Garvin, supra note 5, at 129–31 (citing Bourget v. State, 634 So. 2d 1109,
1110 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1994)).
140. For a sampling of this literature, see generally Wayne A. Logan & Ronald F.
Wright, Mercenary Criminal Justice, 2014 U. ILL. L. REV. 1175 (2014); Neil L. Sobol,
Charging the Poor: Criminal Justice Debt & Modern-Day Debtors’ Prisons, 75 MD. L. REV.
486 (2016); Laura I. Appleman, Nickel and Dimed into Incarceration: Cash-Register Justice
in the Criminal System, 57 B.C. L. REV. 1483 (2016); and John Logan Koepke & David G.
Robinson, Danger Ahead: Risk Assessment and the Future of Bail Reform, 93 WASH. L.
REV. 1725 (2018).
141. Funding victim compensation programs just through tax dollars or court assess-
ments is not without controversy; some victims believe that this funding approach relieves
the defendant of all responsibility to pay for losses he caused. See, e.g., Matt Markovich, A
‘free ride’?: King Co. Taxpayers to Pay Back Some Crime Victims in New Program, KOMO
NEWS (Nov. 24, 2020), https://komonews.com/news/operation-crime-justice/new-king-
county-program-will-use-taxpayer-money-to-support-crime-victims [https://perma.cc/
8YQ3-JD38].
142. Terry-Ann Craigie, Ames Grawert, Cameron Kimble & Joseph E. Stiglitz, Convic-
tion, Imprisonment, and Lost Earnings, BRENNAN CTR. FOR JUST. (Sept. 15, 2020), https://
www.brennancenter.org/our-work/research-reports/conviction-imprisonment-and-lost-
earnings-how-involvement-criminal [https://perma.cc/WZ95-379C].
143. Wealth effects cannot be completely eliminated from the criminal courts, as de-
fendants with means can hire private counsel while indigent defendants cannot. But wealth
does not determine who has a right to counsel in the first place. Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S.
458, 462 (1938) (providing right to counsel in federal court under the Sixth Amendment);
Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335, 344–45 (1963) (providing right to counsel in state
courts under the Sixth Amendment).
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a full-restitution-up-front requirement is too delicate to withstand these
costs.
V. CONCLUSION
In this Article, I have illuminated two problems that surface at the in-
tersection between diversion programming and calls for enhanced vic-
tims’ rights in the United States. These points of concern are the proper
level of victim input into the diversion offer and the mechanism for mak-
ing restitution payments to the victim. I have argued that while the prose-
cutor ought to account for the victim’s position when deciding both
whether to make the diversion offer to an eligible defendant and how to
structure restitution payments, systemic interests in the fiscal soundness
of the diversion program and our commitment to fairness and compas-
sion must remain paramount. Prosecutors who excessively defer to victim
opinions risk causing “distortions of justice” that dilute the moral credi-
bility of the legal system.144 Instances of deference might assuage particu-
lar victims in the short term, but over the long run they cause a crisis of
legitimacy for criminal legal institutions writ large and threaten to under-
mine the entire diversion enterprise.
A program that rests ultimate decisions about diversion eligibility on a
victim’s individual preference or a defendant’s immediate ability to pay is
at odds with the sense of objectivity and critical distance that ought to
guide decisions of this sort. Conditioning program participation on the
consent of a particular victim risks introducing a form of arbitrariness
into the justice system at a time when we ought to embrace fairness and
transparency. Likewise, requiring full payment of restitution up front cre-
ates a barrier to entry for defendants on the basis of wealth, and ulti-
mately limits the number of victims who will receive any money for their
losses. Neither outcome can be justified by the call for increased victims’
rights.
Improved respect for and treatment of victims remains a laudable goal.
But achieving this goal will require greater resources and attentiveness by
prosecutors and judges145 instead of more formal law or diversion eligibil-
ity requirements,146 particularly if those requirements place defendants’
constitutional rights and state budgets in jeopardy. “[E]veryday coopera-
144. Robinson, supra note 113, at 757; see also Henning, supra note 9, at 1142 (warning
that excessive attention to victims’ rights will “distort the balance” between rehabilitation
and accountability).
145. Schipper & Barnhill, supra note 85. For example, prosecutors could embrace per-
formance metrics that help them track how often and how frequently they connect with
victims in a given case, see, e.g., Protecting & Serving Victims, PROSECUTORIAL PERFORM-
ANCE INDICATORS, https://prosecutorialperformanceindicators.org/protecting-serving-vic-
tims/ [https://perma.cc/2T66-YR5T], or encourage victims to participate in restorative
justice programs to share their feelings about the crime with the offender in a more pro-
ductive setting, see Henning, supra note 9, at 1162–64.
146. Mosteller, supra note 4, at 444–45.
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tion”147 will get us further than victims’ rights assertions that ignore the
consequences felt by or costs imposed on other justice system actors.
Recognizing a sense of “inner-connectedness is especially important, be-
cause as Miriam Krinsky and Liz Komar emphasize in their contribution
to this volume, the line that separates the defendant population from the
victim population is often porous rather than solid.
Diversion programs emerged after decades of conventional law and or-
der approaches decimated state coffers, destroyed inner city populations,
and diminished respect for criminal justice institutions. We have only just
recently begun to emerge from that crater, and we cannot afford, finan-
cially or morally, to go backwards, not even in the name of victims’ rights.
147. JONATHAN M. METZL, DYING OF WHITENESS: HOW THE POLITICS OF RACIAL RE-
SENTMENT IS KILLING AMERICA’S HEARTLAND 19 (2019).
